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Abstract: Price plays a unique role in neoliberal economic theory, quantifying value and pro-
viding markets with the information needed to produce equilibrium conditions and optimal
social welfare. While the role of price is clear, the mechanisms by which prices are discovered,
and by which the commodities they value are defined, are left obscure in neoliberal theory.
Automatic price discovery, and self-evident commodity identities, are assumed. Observation of
newly created markets in ecosystem services suggests that this is a moment of significant ten-
sion within neoliberal practice, as potential market participants seek guidance from the state on
appropriate commodity measures and pricing practices. Bureaucrats and economists, following
the neoliberal preference for governance over government, turn the task back onto civil society.
The invocation of abstract rules, instead of the formulation of practical guidance, by policy-
makers means that the neoliberal marketization of non-market public goods is a contingent and
sometimes rudderless task for those who must make markets work on the ground. This presents
many opportunities for constructive engagement on the part of geographers and other critics of
neoliberal strategy.
Keywords: Ecosystem services, neoliberal economics, price discovery, wetland banking,
water quality trading, commodification of nature.
If you think prices come from markets, then you think milk comes
from bottles. (Dan Bromley1)
Introduction
On a hot July day in Washington, DC in 2005, a forum of environmental
policy-makers and private-sector stakeholders convened at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace to begin building a new market.
Over the past decade, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) have made increasingly
determined attempts to create the necessary institutional support for
trading water quality credits. In this, they have been buoyed by the
success of other “regulatory markets” such as those for air pollution and
wetlands, and their efforts have recently reached a new pitch with three
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major workshops in 2005–2006 and the issuance of a joint memorandum
on the subject (EPA and USDA 2006). And yet, to the growing frustration
of headquarters staff and managers, no market has emerged. The urgency
of the matter comes from the fact that the 1977 Clean Water Act (CWA)
forbids facilities from discharging pollutants into water without a permit;
obtaining such a permit has come to entail such delay and technological
sophistication that overwhelming political pressure now bears on the
project of making CWA compliance cheaper and faster. Since the late
1980s, the efficiency of markets at finding least-cost solutions has been
the main rubric of American environmental policy reform (EPA EITF
1991). At the Carnegie conference, after some introductory remarks by
a political appointee touching on the nonpartisan and inevitable nature
of market-based environmental policy and the power of citizens in free
markets to effect beneficial social change, a University of Maryland
economist stood up to say what nobody wanted to hear.
He announced a profound skepticism about the ability of strictly free
markets to meet environmental regulatory goals, such as the goal of lim-
iting contaminants in rivers and streams. His skepticism stemmed from
the fact that, as has been pointed out by many resource economists,
demand and supply in such regulatory markets are entirely controlled—
entirely created—by regulatory directives rather than the utility func-
tions of individual market participants. The supply of the commodity
“water quality”, he noted, is a function of the regulatory standards ap-
plied to the measurement of improvements in water quality: “You can
always make the supply and demand curves cross if you can get the
regulator to water down the scoring criteria”.2 Crucially, and for max-
imum rhetorical effect, his critique was aimed specifically at that icon
of equilibrium economics, the supply/demand curve. Suggesting that
the market-clearing price produced by this curve is not the product of
exogenous human desires constituted an outright attack on the two fun-
damental theorems of welfare economics3 which underpin neoliberal
thinking, and quick action was needed to save the day for market enthu-
siasts. Fortunately, another political appointee was on hand, and leapt
quickly up to offer the simple bromide of Say’s Law: supply will create
its own sufficient demand. As this was considered self-evidently true, it
cleared the furrowed brows of the assembled experts.
Say’s Law, in its “pure” form (a form never actually articulated by the
19th-century economist Jean-Baptiste Say; Rosenberg 1992) serves as
a sort of narrative underpinning for the centrality of equilibrium analy-
sis and the price theory of value in modern mainstream economics.4 It
is one of those delicious omphalic credos that lie at the heart of many
a sprawling research paradigm. While it is mainly of historical inter-
est to most economists, its simplicity allows it to persist in popular
rhetoric as an ideological invocation, entreating a level of demand to is-
sue forth from the black box of individual utility within us all sufficient to
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consume available supply. Leon Walras’ two theorems of 1874, elegantly
mathematized in the Arrow-Debreu proof of 1953 (Mirowski 2001:268),
expanded upon Say’s Law and required price to be the mechanism which
coordinates this balance between demand and supply to the point of
Pareto-optimality, where no further increase in net social welfare is pos-
sible through market exchange (Rosenberg 1992:99). When harnessed
to the postwar neoclassical economists’ methodological commitment
to individualism and rational actors, the macroeconomic imperatives of
Say and Walras were brought down to the scale of the mind of each
market agent.
The stakes are thus very high, as the theoretical rationale for neoliberal
capitalism has been erected on individual rationality and Walrasian equi-
librium. For Walras’ equilibrium theory to work, price signals must serve
as the information that allows rational actors in a free market to take stock
of their own desires against the resources needed to satisfy them. Thus
price is theorized in classical liberal economics as the purest expres-
sion of value. For mainstream economists,5 achieving social welfare
becomes, in part, a process of facilitating accurate price discovery, of
providing rational market actors with enough and sufficiently accurate
information to respond to price signals. Of the many lines of criticism
which come to bear on this claim, one in particular points out that Wal-
ras’ and Say’s principles apply only to markets in equilibrium, which is
a condition that is almost never observed. Hodgson notes the cop-out,
calling Walras’ solution a deux ex machina which is premised on a for-
getting of history, experience, and common sense about price behavior:
“In neoclassical theory the only kind of price norm is the ex post equi-
librium price. It is presumed to be formed after an extensive process of
market adjustment and price signaling in logical rather than historical
time” (1988:182). As the very name “discovery” implies, it is expected
to emerge fully-formed from its cache.
But what about new markets? Markets where there is not only no
extended history of price discovery, but in which the very identity of
the commodity requiring a price is still in flux? This paper is concerned
with observing the emergence of commodity identity and price in such a
market—prices that, we are assured after-the-fact by the partisan repre-
sentatives of the neoliberal capitalist state, emerged from the unmediated
expression of human desires. While these are quite specialized markets
that are called forth to achieve the regulatory goals of the CWA, they may
also be similar to the nascent markets that are arguably commonplace
all around us, but about which the dominant theorems driving economic
research programs have virtually nothing to say. Observing the difficult
birth of one such market, I found Say’s Law pulled into service to dis-
pel anxiety rather than to explain observed data: we need not fear for
the future of a market in tradable water quality credits, for Say’s Law
tells us that buyers will appear if credits are produced. And although the
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theorems of welfare economics were not named as such in these forums
(presumably due to the inside-the-beltway polysemy of “welfare”), their
messages were constantly invoked to reassure us that the market price
for credits will coordinate supply and demand such that optimal social
welfare is achieved.
The point is not that facile misreadings of Say and Walras do injus-
tice to the original thinkers themselves, but rather that such invocations
are the ideological wheels on which neoliberal capitalism achieves its
expansionist dynamic. This tendency on the part of market advocates is
particularly clear in the recent effort to bootstrap “ecosystem services”
markets into existence (Costanza et al 1997; Daily 1997; Daily and
Ellison 2002; EPA 2003; McAfee 1999; NRC 2005; Turner et al 2003).
By casting elements of the environment as “services” which provide
value to human societies, they hope to stimulate environmental conser-
vation through privatization and ownership. Following a line of logic
that runs from Locke through Walras to Coase, the main thrust of these
efforts has been to define new elements of the environment as property,
distribute the rights to its ownership, and hope that markets and prices
follow as rain follows the plow. There is every reason to suspect, however,
that this latest round of the commodification of nature will experience
the same contradictions as any attempt to establish markets in what Karl
Polanyi (1944) termed “fictitious commodities” (Castree 1995, 2002;
J O’Connor 1994; M O’Connor 1994).
But my aim here is not to fire a theoretical broadside concerning the
fundamental instabilities and injuries of capital; the claim that neoliberal
economic policy makes unrealistic assumptions is by now heavily bela-
bored and exhaustively documented. My wish here is instead to observe
neoliberal capitalism in situ in the context of a specific engagement with
environmental policy, to show how these precepts force actual market
participants into logical conundra, and how they do or do not work them-
selves out. The creation of new markets in novel kinds of commodities
is a moment of particular importance in the definition of new kinds of
property and the expansion of neoliberal capitalism, and I examine this
moment through an ethnographic approach to the definition of tradable
property in environmental services, and the measure of these properties
through price. The material in this paper was gathered through inter-
views with the producers, consumers, and regulators of regional mar-
kets in wetland credits and of the prospective markets in water quality
credits, as well as through participation in three national workshops on
the subject of challenges to the development of water quality markets.
Work documenting the on-the-ground overcoming (or not) of the con-
tradictions of capitalism will lead to finer-grained understandings, and
can provide a tonic against the depressing tendency to see capital as
unitary and omnipotent (Gibson-Graham 1993; McAfee 2003). Bakker
(2005), for example, provides an excellent taxonomy in the course
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of suggesting that much of what we refer to using the blanket term
“commodification of nature” actually consists of three interrelated mo-
ments: privatization (efforts to change ownership), commercialization
(efforts to introduce efficiency and standardize production and mea-
surement) and commodification (efforts to construct a market and make
products fungible). Throughout this paper, it will be possible to observe
these processes as overlapping, at times abandoned, and not understood
as separate by the participants. It is also significant that participants in
these debates do not even perceive these consistently as tasks to be ac-
complished at all: specifically, the market builders assume the automatic
achievement of two important tasks which are actually an expansive and
time-consuming task of institutional construction: the definition of the
commodity and the discovery of price (which might fit into Bakker’s
typology as components of commercialization and commodification,
respectively). The work of achieving these two tasks was actually emi-
nently visible at the table in the July workshop, but to formally recognize
such work would be to undercut the conceptual apparatus that sustains
neoliberalism and minimizes the role of government. A hallmark of ne-
oliberal policy is that it seeks to move outside of the formal apparatus
of the state—castigated as ossified and insufficiently democratic—to
achieve policy aims through the institutions of civil society (Amin and
Thrift 1995; Peck and Tickell 2002) and an effective, direct and inher-
ently democratic free market (Huber 1999). But, in practice, efforts to
develop neoliberal environmental policy have led to endless numbers
of “stakeholder forums”, in which to achieve the outcome and effect of
market-led environmental governance, we had to avert our eyes from
the actual acts of government occurring at a table crowded with bureau-
crats.
Say What? New Commodities
I will focus my discussion on two developing markets: a planned market
in water quality credits, and a young but extant market in wetland credits.
Both have been promoted heavily by recent Administrations as private-
sector solutions to the regulatory burdens imposed by the CWA of 1972
(EPA 2003; USACOE and EPA 2006; WHOEP 1993).
Wetland credits have been created and sold by entrepreneurial
providers since 1992, in response to the CWA requirement that wetland
impacts be compensated for by the party applying for a permit to fill
wetlands; compensation usually consists of an equal or greater acreage
of restored or created wetlands. Throughout the 1980s, nearly all com-
pensation sites were constructed by the permit holder, and the highly
uneven environmental results are a matter of record (NRC 2001). Since
the early 1990s, however, regulators have been encouraging the develop-
ment of both public and private “wetland banks”, large pre-constructed
acreages of restored wetland, which can be certified as containing a
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certain number of credits for sale to permit holders. Purchase of such
credits satisfies permittees’ CWA obligations. Wetland banks, although
ecologically problematic in many ways, provide greater assurance of
ultimate regulatory success than permittee-built compensation sites;
banking has received some support among the environmental and reg-
ulatory community despite ingrained suspicion that wetland bank en-
trepreneurs “make a profit” off of wetland destruction (ELI 2002; Sib-
bing 2005; SWS 2005). Banks also have been specifically promoted
by both the Clinton and GW Bush administrations as a market-led way
to reduce the cost of regulatory burdens (EPA 2005; USACOE et al
1995). There are currently several hundred entrepreneurial providers of
wetland credits around the nation, and price-based competition among
them is said to exist in many areas. They have formed a national lobby
(http://www.mitigationbanking.com) and have become quite influential
as a self-described pro-environment constituent within the larger land
development industry.
In the case of water quality trading, the limits placed on point-source
(piped) inputs of pollutants into rivers have successfully reduced the
level of pollutants entering the nation’s waters, but the development of
new polluting facilities challenges these limits. Rather than demanding
ever-increasing levels of pollution control (which faces technical barri-
ers and achieves diminishing environmental returns past a certain point),
regulators have attempted to arrange for trades to occur between point-
source polluters and the large population of unregulated “non-point-
source” polluters6, mainly agricultural operations, which can cheaply
and easily reduce their contribution to water pollution. Participation in
such markets in the role of “credit providers” is voluntary on the part
of farmers. However, it is usually less expensive for farmers to reduce
pollutant runoff from their fields into rivers than it is for, say, an urban
water treatment plant to squeeze another increment of pollutant reduc-
tion out of an already very clean process. Market enthusiasts, always alert
to such gaping differences in marginal cost, have argued that allowing
polluters to buy pollution reduction credits from farmers can dramati-
cally lower the cost of compliance for point-source polluters. An urban
sewage treatment plant can buy a reduction in pounds of nitrogen much
more cheaply from a farmer willing to change tillage practices than it
can by retrofitting its system once again.
Given the obvious economic efficiency, it has stumped regulators
and economists alike that, after nearly a decade of promotion by the
EPA, a market in water quality trading (WQT) has failed to emerge.
Hoping to inject a note of practical achievements on-the-ground into
the prospects for WQT, the organizers of the Carnegie conference in
Washington offered a chance for WQT to “learn from” the established
success of wetland bank credit markets. The ensuing debate (as well as
the discussions dominating a follow-up forum in Chicago in February of
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2006; EPA ORD forthcoming) was strong on highly abstract questions
of commodity definition and the invocation of economic platitudes, but
could not come to grips with specific interventions. To the jaundiced
eye of institutional and Marxist economics, it was a theatre demonstrat-
ing the consequences of neoliberal economics’ formal blindness to the
complexity of social structures which underlie and support markets. The
forums on WQT were so thick with ad hoc and unsteady retellings of
the fundamentals of welfare economics that participants were reduced
to invoking “free-market-based, you know, supply-and-demand, capital-
ism, whatever you want to call it”.7 Having been assured that Say’s Law
would provide demand for, and accurately price, whatever WQT credits
were supplied, regulators and entrepreneurs found themselves unable
to comfortably specify and justify the actual interventions required to
establish a market.
Demand Will Appear . . . But For What?
How do we [plan a production strategy] in Water Quality Trading? We
can’t do this! The market will do this. If you’ve got your command-and-
control hat on, take it off, put it in the back. (Tony Prato, economist8)
What you have is a commodity that you can’t really observe. (Jim
Shortle, agricultural economist9)
Whereas the Walrasian “auctioneer” (an avatar of the market who
plays a coordinating role in connecting buyers with sellers) is theoreti-
cally a costless and effortless creation (Boyer 1997), agreement on the
actual coordinating institutions of water quality trading has proven to
be intractable. Prato’s epigram above suggests the tension in the room:
on the one hand, the scientists and bureaucrats were admonished to be
humble in the face of the power of the market to automatically discover
appropriate products, prices, and production strategies. On the other
hand, why had they been assembled if not to provide precisely such
guidance? The paralysis this produced was palpable.
In this section I want to analyze one institution-building aspect of
the debate which unfolded over the two conferences: what is the new
property, the commodity being traded? “Water quality”, said the title of
the forum, but what is it and how is it measured? Considerable ener-
getic debate explored the various ways of defining and measuring the
commodity, but each potential resolution posed obstacles.
In a WQT market, someone who makes efforts that improve water
quality can receive credit for those efforts, and then sell that credit to
another party who wishes to degrade water quality in the same waterway
to the same degree. It is therefore not a way to reduce pollution, but rather
a way to allow the operation of comparative advantage to lower costs.
Typically, an urban water treatment plant will purchase such credits from
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upstream farmers, so that the treatment plant may exceed the nitrogen
limits imposed on them by the EPA. Such farmers may take measures
(known as “best management practices”, or BMPs), such as conservation
tillage, which are known to reduce the runoff of nitrogen from farm fields.
Crucial questions arise immediately. Must the farmer’s actions actu-
ally produce a measurable reduction in nitrogen loads downstream, or
is installation of the BMPs sufficient to generate credit? How is an im-
provement to be certified and warranted? How can a regulatory agency
document that pollution reductions are due to a farmer’s BMP, given
the dynamism of the entire landscape in contributing nitrogen to that
stream? The answers to such measurement questions give shape to the
commodity, and the lack of clear answers means that the commodity has
a somewhat ethereal existence. For example, even if the nitrogen levels
are measured a mile downstream from the farmer’s field, the specific
change produced by the farmer’s BMPs will be hard to detect among the
“noise” of other changes in the landscape. Such difficulties stimulated
participants to find proxy measures that bypassed highly uncertain mea-
surement methods. But if a WQT credit is not measured as a quantity
of contaminant abatement downstream of the credit provider’s facility,
what is the identity of the commodity? Many answers were offered.
Functional Lift
Ecologists at the conference claimed that the most direct and scientific
way of measuring the WQT commodity is as an increment of change at
the site where abatement activities are carried out. This is often termed
“functional lift”; that is, the credit represents the increase in environmen-
tal quality or function (in terms of decreased nitrogen contribution to
a waterway near the farmer’s land) compared with what the farmer’s
land would have contributed without the abatement activities (the
“baseline”). Although this is a common-sensical method suggested by
many at the conference, immense problems of measurement present
themselves to conceiving of the commodity in this way. Firstly, ecol-
ogists objected that the baseline is a speculative condition that would
change over time in unknowable ways. They also questioned the ability
to quantify the lift provided by various BMPs. As ecologists described
the intensive monitoring regime necessary to defensibly document “lift”,
economists and regulators began to protest that such certainty would be
too time- and labor-intensive to achieve. Their objections were revealing.
Economists viewed such information gathering as excessive because the
credit purchaser’s utility is fulfilled without knowing the exact ecologi-
cal state of the abatement measure. Regulators viewed such information
gathering as excessive because it would provide more data than the
regulatory staff could absorb in making a determination that the farmer
is in compliance.
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Regulatory Relief
Some conference participants referred to the commodity as a unit of
regulatory relief, measurable as “velocity through a regulatory system”.
This definition has the advantage of complete frankness: both credit
producers and credit purchasers are completely disinterested in the eco-
logical outcomes of their transactions. Credit purchasers desire only the
rapid resolution of their encounter with the CWA permit program. The
mercenary nature of this definition makes some PR-conscious market
enthusiasts nervous, and has stimulated economists to use game theory
to model markets where utility of both buyers and sellers is maximized
by collaborating to force the market regulators to lower certification
standards (King and Kuch 2003). That is, if credit producers can make
subpar credits cheaply, and sell them cheaply to purchasers, without
triggering regulatory compliance measures, a market mechanism will
function admirably while failing to produce improved environmental
conditions.
Liability
A similar way of speaking about the commodity—but one that didn’t
trigger such unease—was to refer to it as a purchasable transfer of liabil-
ity. That is, WQT credit providers take on, for a fee, the responsibility of
and liability for complying with the effluent limitations that a credit pur-
chaser wishes to exceed. While a market in “regulatory relief” remains
metaphorical, a market in transferable liability has clear precedent in the
insurance and financial bonding industries. However, a commodity mea-
sured in “liability” has no closer a relationship to the ecological status
of abatement sites than one measured in “regulatory relief”, and faced
similar strong opposition from environmentalist and scientific interest
groups.
Time
The purpose of the Carnegie forum was for WQT to absorb the lessons of
the successful wetland credit market, but a crucial difference emerged
on the issue of commodity measurement. WQT credits, as property,
have a temporal dimension and can expire: the purchase of lift, relief
or liability is tied to the duration of the purchaser’s need to exceed
their own effluent limitations and thus must be expressed in units of
lift/time, relief/time and liability/time, rather than just lift, relief or li-
ability. Once the purchaser no longer needs the abatement, it can be
bought by another purchaser. Wetland credits, by contrast, are sold to
permanently compensate for impacts to wetlands. This essential differ-
ence prompted one wetland credit producer to repeatedly claim, “I am in
the graveyard business!”: like the sale of a graveyard plot, the sale of his
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commodity permanently retires its value. As fundamental as this differ-
ence is, it was not immediately appreciated by conference participants
that adding a temporal dimension to the definition of the commodity
might call for entirely different production strategies and initial rights
allocations.
Probability
A fifth way in which the potential commodity was defined was in terms
of the probability of its existence. Given the overwhelming problems of
measurement and confirmation posed by ground-verifying the existence
of hundreds (or thousands) of water quality abatement sites, on scattered
farmsteads, prototype markets in water quality such as the South Nation
River watershed in Ontario10 and the Greater Miami River Watershed
Water Quality Trading Program in Ohio11 have encouraged the use of
remote sensing and random sampling to certify the existence of the
commodity. This gives the commodity a distinctly stochastic definition;
in the Carnegie forum, it was proposed by an economist that perhaps
10% of all WQT credit-generating sites should be evaluated per year,
and that the statistical Law of Large Numbers will guarantee that, in
the aggregate, sufficient water quality abatement would be achieved to
meet regulatory requirements.12 This use of the Law of Large Numbers,
much like the use of Say’s Law, ventured far beyond the limits imposed
by the Law’s formal assumptions and served mainly to attempt closure
of the debate on the nature of the commodity.
How far this babel of commodity definitions is from Say’s confident
predictions of demand! It is undeniably a little silly to be beating up
on Say at this point in history, but his prominent invocation suggests
that he cannot rest and must be continually invoked to first settle, and
then obliterate the memory of, such debates. WQT is proving to be a
tough case for equilibrium economics, however, and the nature of the
three-way chicken-and-egg debate is now clear: of the institutional per-
spectives represented at the table, neither bureaucrats nor capitalists nor
scientists wanted to claim responsibility for making the hard founda-
tional choices about what would constitute the object of utility, desire
and property in this market. More precisely, bureaucrats and scientists
tossed the hot potato between them, while economists insisted that the
game is futile. Representatives of the regulatory state insisted, in varying
language, that “the science will tell us what is required to certify that
water quality improvements are real and therefore fungible”. Scientists
responded with equal vigor that “we could tell you a universe of things
about water quality, but only regulation can place parameters on the dis-
cussion such that our information is useful”. Finally, economists insist
that such parameterizing can only be done by the invisible hand: the
market is capable of producing only optimal social welfare, and neither
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science nor policy can engineer its results without destroying its identity
as a market.13
Let’s Talk About Price
The fiction of a minimalist state is belied by the reality of the state
as entrepreneur, banker, distorter of prices, capitalist policeman and
promoter of capitalist networks. (Michael Watts 1994:380)
The prospective market in WQT credits is at such a nascent stage
that debates such as the one outlined above do not yet show a trajec-
tory toward resolution. Lacking even a stable commodity identity, a
whole suite of follow-on questions cannot even be asked, making the
invocation of Say’s Law particularly premature. Let us now look at
the wetland banking market, which is slightly further down the road
and has (however contingently) resolved the debate over the identity
of the property being traded. Banking provides a window on the next
struggle: the effort to discover a market-clearing price. This is really
the moment where Say’s Law is supposed to earn its keep, where the
automatic, effortless coordination of supply and demand, with only the
lightest of guidance from a minimalist state, is supposed to produce a
market-clearing price that fully reflects the value of the commodity to
society. Experience tells the skeptical observer that a great deal of work
will be required, and then effaced, in achieving this. It is therefore inter-
esting to examine how economists talk about price in wetland banking
markets, in comparison with how the banking entrepreneurs themselves
actually set price, and explain that action to themselves and others.
Economic Theorists
it does not matter whether the economic system is named capitalist
or socialist. It all amounts to whether the pricing policy is based on
marginalist principals, which will lead to the optimum allocation of
resources. (Tjalling Koopmans 1945, in Mirowski 2001:244)
Economists who work on wetland credit markets acknowledge that
these markets are not self-regulating, and that they are fully dependent on
strong state regulatory power in the generation of all demand and supply
(King and Herbert 1997; Oates 2006; Scodari and Shabman 1995). And
yet, agentless price discovery surfaces repeatedly in their analysis as the
social-welfare-maximizing tool which justifies market-based policies.
To be fair, this is the only acceptable way within mainstream economics
to theorize the existence of prices for wetland credits—and they do exist,
apparently negotiated between buyer and seller with no interference
from regulators, a fact which intoxicates the most cautious neoliberal
economist. A world of acknowledged evidence that the market runs on
regulation and not price is thrown aside.
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Resource economists’ enthusiasm over the wetland credit market’s
ability to produce prices is understandable. The history of theoretical
writing on market environmentalism amounts to a sustained lamenta-
tion over the lack of prices which would give market participants enough
information to engage in rational choices. Hahn in 1983 described the
fundamental task in constructing an ecosystem service market as a ques-
tion of eliciting price: “the basic objectives are to design a market that
will elicit a price signal, induce efficient abatement decisions and satisfy
considerations of equity” (88). Likewise, Shabman and Batie expressed
cynicism about the conservation efforts of the 1970s because of the lack
of price:
Because property rights for these ecological services are ill-defined,
and because costs of transacting between owners of wetlands and ben-
eficiaries of ecological services are high, there are no markets where
owners of wetlands can sell ecological services to willing buyers. As a
result, the market price for wetlands will not reflect the value of these
ecological services. (Shabman and Batie 1980:3)
There has thus been considerable celebration that the actual value
of wetland ecosystems had finally been revealed in wetland banking
markets:
The value of a [wetland] credit can be determined by looking at costs
faced by an applicant that has no credits . . . An applicant will pay at
least [the option cost] for available credits. The holder of the credits
knows what it costs to produce those credits. If the applicant who
needs the credits offers the holder of the credits an acceptable rate of
return, a sale will be made. Once a sale has occurred, a value has been
determined. (Zagata 1992)
The tantalizing existence of prices did not cause economists to for-
get the complicated regulatory architecture that created supply and de-
mand, but it did cause them to make rather unguarded and optimistic
predictions. The following restatement of the welfare economics credo
announced, in a very widely cited policy work on wetland banking, that
wetland credit commodities could be expected to behave as any other
commodity: “it is the interaction of supply and demand within each
region that establishes credit prices and the number of credits needing
to be supplied” (Shabman, Scodari and King 1994). This statement is
followed by an extended narrative scenario in which economically ratio-
nal actors arrive at different prices given different initial distribution of
rights. It is a modern and specific retelling of the two theorems of welfare
economics accompanied, in a subsequent report from the same series, by
a diagram that achieves much the same effect (Figure 1). “Yes”, it seems
to say, “there are a multitude of contingent and inconvenient factors that
may interfere with the ability of the market mechanism to deliver the
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Figure 1: Diagram of the operation of a wetland credit market (source: Shabman,
Scodari and King 1996)
promised maximal social welfare”. But they are graphically dismissed.
As if the Hudson River school had tackled a box-and-arrow diagram,
the wilderness of regulatory and non-market influences gives way to the
ordered and civilized simplicity of the supply and demand curve: at the
bottom of the diagram—to which all boxes point their arrows—sits our
old friend the market-clearing price.
In more earthbound moments, economists talk frankly about the po-
tential for perverse and persistent regulatory policies to interfere in the
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price mechanism, such that it may inevitably produce irrational results.
Such problems had been predicted since the early observations of price
in air pollution credit markets in the early 1980s:
there are many cases where exchanges occur without money passing
hands; where exchanges occur but they are not freely entered into;
where exchanges are so constrained by institutional rules that it would
be dubious to infer that the terms were satisfactory; and where imper-
fections in the conditions of exchange would lead us to conclude that
the price ratios do not reflect a corporate social judgments about val-
ues. Each of these cases gives rise to deficiencies in the use of existing
price data as the basis of evaluation of input or outputs. (Shabman and
Batie 1980:5)
This concern is familiar in the wetland credit market of 2006, but
takes on an urgently pragmatic tone: now that we finally have the ca-
pacity to generate prices, economists say, the goal of policy must be to
ensure that regulatory and non-market factors don’t interfere with the
generation of accurate price signals. All such interference, by definition,
is exogenous to the market and to the intimate dance by which buyer
and seller determine price. Left alone, this process will be rational and
generate the promised social welfare. Price distortions, and therefore
market failures, are to be explained in terms of regulatory interference,
spatial monopolies, or inelastic demand—anything but problems with
the fundamental capacity of a buyer to recognize a manufactured com-
modity as an object that increases his or her utility, and to purchase it
at a price which reflects that utility with crystalline accuracy. In fact,
the pellucid transparency of the unfettered market is frequently invoked
in both WQT and wetland banking forums: “The transparency of the
market helps create the clarity that is needed”, and requires only “that
a willing buyer and a willing seller know what they’re buying, what the
price is, and that they can count on the product”.14 The various fetters
placed on markets, and problems in defining commodities and discov-
ering prices, can create the impression of hopeless entanglement with
extra-market social forces. Nevertheless,
Before we submit to this incubus of complexity, however, we might
seek comfort in the reflection that the great virtue of a pricing
system is that it solves, avoids, mediates, or somehow manages to
dispel, all sorts of complexities, particularly those that arise from var-
ious interdependencies between uses and users of goods. (Dales 1968:
792)
Belief in the market-clearing price can, in other words, be tested,
wrestled with, raged against, and can generate schisms, but will in the
end reward faith with grace.
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Entrepreneurial Bankers
This optimism is why, in dispensing advice to his fellow wetland bank
entrepreneurs, Michael Rolband can cast the basic challenge of banking
in terms of price:
As for any product, classical supply/demand relationships will deter-
mine the appropriate price of mitigation credits . . . The fundamental
economic test that a wetland bank must meet is the ability to sell credits
at a price that exceeds expected costs and investor return requirements.
(Rolband et al 2000:203–210)
As a national figure in the industry, it is Rolband’s prerogative to
invoke such abstractions from the pulpit of a major policy publication.
But his advice offers little practical guidance, and few bankers join
him in these sentiments when discussing the task of setting price in
actual transactions. In asking entrepreneurial bankers what their actual
practice is in setting price, I am doing something deeply irrational by
the lights of mainstream economic theorists. Since the Chicago-school
economists led by Milton Friedman dismissed the need for empirical
verification of the models of quantitative economics, the investigation of
actual thoughts and opinions of market participants have been considered
somewhat quaint and certainly irrelevant in the face of nearly universal
acceptance of aggregate rationality (Ma¨ki 2000; Mirowski 2001:198;
Rosenberg 1992:88). Asking individuals for their personal justifications
of their own actions is thus akin to asking the roulette ball why it fell
on 33.
Nonetheless, if we fail to insist that the way people think about, talk
about, and act out the supposed iron imperatives of the market, we
would be conceding to Friedman, vacating without contest the forums
in which the invisible hand materializes in the bodies and actions of
men and women. In that spirit, I have observed that wetland bankers do
not tend to behave as if they were being puppetted by market forces,
or seeking some demand-coordinating auctioneer, or even particularly
interested in the market-clearing price. They are reflective, irrational,
conflicted about their many possible roles, and apparently incapable—
even if the institutions of the market allowed for perfect exchange—
of arriving at Pareto-optimal outcomes. Four trends are evident in the
practices by which entrepreneurial bankers set their credit prices; they
are exemplified below, in excerpts from interviews conducted in 2001
and 2002.
Don’t Consider the Economic Situation of the Customer, or
Even Negotiate over Prices
MR: How do you set your prices?
S36: We do it by what the market will bear.
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MR: Just ask the customer?
S36: Well, we just set it . . . we said $25,000. They didn’t baulk. And I
figured, you know, the back of the envelope . . . figured that we could
do that and maybe make a little money . . .
(Chicago banker15)
The market-clearing calculus that is supposed to produce a price is
nowhere apparent in this banker’s account of setting a price. If the “dis-
covery” of accurate price is composed of thousands of such moments,
the Law of Large Numbers cannot help us since this banker is not using
the “appropriate” criteria to set a price. Even the faintest interest in the
capacity of a given client, or a class of clients, to pay a higher price would
give the economist some scrap of hope for a Pareto-optimal outcome,
but this banker was adamant that extensive negotiation over prices was
extraneous to his business model. The back of his envelope contained
no information about the economic situation of his customer, instead
containing an entirely one-sided calculus concerning his own economy:
what price would clear him a reasonable profit? The customer “not
baulking” is the only moment of negotiation. Such asymmetry is quite
common in many markets (think of the lack of negotiation over prices
next time you visit the grocery store), but is still somewhat scandalous
to neoclassical economic purists. Price discovery in the classical sense
should proceed from this point until the customer does baulk, but the
trade magazine Chicago Business noted without evident concern that this
is not the standard practice in the banking industry: “Wetlands Initiative
Senior Vice President Donald Hey says developers don’t negotiate the
price per credit. ‘Nobody has asked for a reduction,’ he says” (Murphy
2002).
Consider Extra-economic Factors in Setting Price
MR: So how do you come up with a price?
S40: Yeah, initially we looked at our costs, and what we anticipated
our long-term costs would be, and arrived at a price that way.
MR: Would you consider the means of the customer?
S40: Yeah, I mean, you know, you kind of get a soft spot for some of
those people, you know . . . I just felt so sorry for that lady, I couldn’t
believe it.
(Minnesota banker16)
There are two significant departures from the two theorems of wel-
fare economics encapsulated here. Once again, this banker is setting
his price with reference mainly to his cost of production rather than
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the ability of the customer to pay for the commodity. But in this case,
while not considering economic means of the customer, he is clearly
and strongly influenced by the distressing predicament of a client. The
case involved a dairy farmer who had been “turned in” to the federal
regulators by recreational hunters for filling in a small section of wet-
land, building a road to allow her cows to access land where the hunters
preferred to shoot. The state issued a cease-and-desist order, ordered the
road removed, and required that the farmer purchase wetland credits as
compensatory mitigation. The wetland banker, a dairy farmer himself,
was strongly influenced to offer a very low price both by feelings of
solidarity against the state and by a degree of class antagonism against
leisure hunters. These factors go considerably beyond the individual
interest-based calculus of homo economicus.
Conduct No Market Research
MR: How did you arrive at 30 cents a square foot?
S9: I get calls, and some character called me from up by Thief
River Falls and wants a price, and—you know, what the hell, you
can’t tell him that its 18,000 dollars an acre. So, I mean, you’d visit
with ‘em, and that’s how I did my research, when people called
me.
(Minnesota banker17)
The active, agent-led moment in price discovery, if there can be said
to be one in the classical formulation, might occur in efforts at mar-
ket research. Commodity producers attempting to trim their production
scheme to the winds of consumer preference and trends in price typically
spend some effort in finding out what their commodity is trading for in
neighboring markets, or what other producers are charging. While the
banker above, unlike the previous examples, does engage in negotiation
over price, he is not atypical in his impatience with these activities. This
is probably because he, like many other bankers throughout the coun-
try, conducts his business as an adjunct to his primary occupation of
residential development. Although there are no data on this matter, it is
clear that many entrepreneurial bankers do not draw all of their income
from credit sales, and many probably do not consider themselves to be
“bankers” primarily or at all. This makes their individual identity in a
market, and their collective identity as a fraction of capital, uncertain
to say the least. If a banker’s action in a market is not informed by
their self-identification as a producer of wetland credits, it becomes en-
tirely unclear which actions qualify as rational and which don’t. Welfare
economics has no concepts to deal with such complicated notions of
agency.
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Take Opportunities to Collude
MR: How will you set a price?
S26: Oh . . . I have a friend of mine that’s doing the same thing, and
he kind of found out from me or he knew about it, so he’s doing it too.
Yeah, he’s a neighbor . . . So we get together, we go golfing once in a
while and stuff. But he’s doing it too, and we have kind of a gentleman’s
agreement, we come up with a price.
(Minnesota banker18)
This kind of casual anti-competitive behavior goes hand-in-hand with
the general lack of concern for maximizing (rather than simply attaining)
profit. Market participants seem to prioritize ensuring stability across a
broader set of social relations, within which the wetland credit market
exists alongside other concerns. Social bonds that go far beyond the
transaction are vital in wetland credit trading not only in situations where
the producer’s identity overflows the category of “banker”, as we have
seen, but also in more conventional scenarios of agency. One banker, who
conducts his business as his sole source of revenue, expresses clearly that
competition is less a matter of price than of the cultivation of networks:
I know a large share of the development community, I know them
well, and so I’ve been able to put together more deals than [I might
have]. If one does not have such affiliations with people, and all you’re
trying to do is compete on price or whatever, that hasn’t proved to be
as beneficial. (Entrepreneurial banker19)
I have suggested elsewhere (Robertson 2006) that the wetland banking
industry is one in which prioritizing the maintenance of social networks
over profit maximization is adaptive in the face of dramatic instability in
the regulatory conditions which create demand. Regulatory changes at
many scales, entirely exogenous to the market, can have a dramatic effect
on production strategy (Robertson 2004); in such a situation, maintaining
a flexible entrepreneurial strategy means tending to the social connec-
tions which can keep a banker afloat in steep seas rather than expending
resources in a quixotic pursuit of the best possible price. This leaves
us with a question that can have thunderous implications for neoliberal
strategy, if taken seriously: what do “price signals” signal when market
participants act in a way informed by any one, if not all four, of the
complicating factors above?
But I do not wish to overstate the case. The above excerpts are not
meant to imply that there are no bankers who negotiate extensively over
prices, conduct market research, forego collusion or retain a professional
disinterest in the personal lives of clients. Recognizable forms of negoti-
ation over price, good-faith attempts to balance the utilities of producer
and customer, in fact, happen every day in this market. But, as in this
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extended excerpt, they tend to affirm the pervasive role of regulatory
force in shaping individual utility functions:
If I sat down with a builder and said, “look, it’s gonna cost you 250
thousand dollars to buy credits from me”, and he says, “Jeez, you
know, my engineer says I can [build a wetland myself] for 200 thou-
sand” I said, “Look. Ninety days from now, you’re gonna have paid me
250 thousand in full, you’re gonna get a letter from the Corps of Engi-
neers, South Florida Water Management District, and Broward County
Department of Environmental Protection saying that you never have
to worry about this again. Your engineer thinks it’s gonna cost 200
thousand including the value of the land”. I said, “You know and I
know . . . that you have a five-year obligation, you have to hire a con-
tractor to do the work, things don’t always go as planned; in five years,
you may have to remediate once or twice or three times. You’re on the
hook, you may have to put a bond up”. I said, “Is it worth 50 thousand
dollars to have this contingent liability, and you haven’t even started
to build this wetland yet, versus ninety days from now, writing me a
check and forgetting about it forever?” It wound up being a good sales
tool. (Florida banker20)
The point of this section is not to suggest that wetland banking is
fundamentally different than other commodity markets—although this
argument can certainly be made. Rather it is to observe that price discov-
ery is always a task achieved by complex agents whose identities exceed
the economic, embedded in networks that extend beyond the breadth of
the wetland credit market. This complexity cannot be wished or theo-
rized away; it can only be undone by the conscious choices of agents
who choose—contingently—to behave in economically rational ways.
I have observed that bankers often seek stability within these larger net-
works, rather than maximizing their transaction-by-transaction profit.
Setting price is only one of many, many decisions they have to make
about achieving financial stability and other forms of non-economic
satisfaction, decisions made more numerous because often the banker’s
economic identity is not firmly that of “producer of credits”. Complex
identities create complex price calculations, and price signals that are
simply uninterpretable within the assumptions of neoliberal economics.
Neoliberal economists recognize this, to a certain degree. To the extent
that they recognize agency as relevant at all, their impulse is usually
to colonize these elements of noneconomic difference within market
participants’ identities by drawing such decisions within the realm of
economic calculus. Rabin (1998:13) begins with admirable candor, that
“[I]t is sometimes misleading to conceptualize people as attempting to
maximize a coherent, stable, and accurately perceived U(x)”, but then—
in a rhetorical move similar to Shabman’s graphical one in Figure 1—he
returns to the arms of economic dogma: “economists ought to become
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aware of the shortcomings of our models, regret these shortcomings, and
keep our eyes open for ways to remedy them”. These arguments always
end up in deeply functionalist places, and when presented with unmodel-
able departures from homo economicus, economists may become rather
impatient:
Claims about that evidence inconsistent with our traditional model of
human behavior can be neglected because the evidence derives from
observations of people insufficiently motivated to behave themselves
according to economic assumptions, or because it fails to bear suf-
ficiently great burdens of proof, or because the implied behavior is
unlikely to matter in the types of (market) settings that economists
care about. (Rabin 1998:41)
Resource economists have long lamented that the lack of actual mar-
kets in ecosystem services such as clean water and wetlands biodiversity
means that their estimation of the value of these services must rely on
methods of dubious reliability such as “willingness-to-pay” surveys or
hedonic analysis. The arrival of actual markets heralds the generation of
“straightforward, readily estimable values” in the form of price (Turner
et al. 2003, 497). This is seen to be somewhat less tidy in practice, as
market actors refuse to be confined within market-rational conceptions
of agency, and price is thus heavily overdetermined.
Consequences for Market Environmentalism
I don’t see anything in Water Quality Trading that I don’t have some-
thing in my [economic theory] bag to pull out and address it with.
(Economist Tony Prato21)
While neoliberal economists tend to view market dynamics without
seeing the people who create those dynamics, critics of neoliberalism
should not make the same mistake. Too often, resistance to neoliberal
strategy is theorized as contingent, rich with diverse agency, and fruit-
fully multivocal, while the forces that advance neoliberal strategy are
described in agency-flattening and even structural terms. The people who
strive to create new markets after the principles of neoliberal economics
are given a difficult task, and the potential regulators, consumers, and
producers of new kinds of commodities are given little practical guidance
in resolving some of the key obstacles. What they are given, and which
must not be discounted, is the benevolent embrace of the state, promises
of subsidy and research, and warm assurances by political figures that
they are “part of the army of citizen conservationists”22 who will lead
this nation out of the morass of 1970s environmental policy errors into a
neoliberal utopia. But these same leaders steadfastly refuse to lead, con-
stantly invoking governance over government: “You are the experts!”23
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conjures one to an audience of prospective entrepreneurs, and another
desires only to “comport . . . with the changes that have already taken
place in the hearts and minds of the American people”.24 In places, the
“neoliberal rollout” (Peck and Tickell 2002) looks as fractured and un-
coordinated as resistance to it, with market actors’ identities exceeding
the economic, state fractions tripping over themselves, and economists
producing policy prescriptions that make entrepreneurial practitioners
gnash their teeth in frustration. This can largely be traced back to the
fact that, while neoliberal policy must be enacted by particular agents in
specific locations, neoliberalism in its purer forms declines to theorize
either agency or location.
Understanding the close texture of individual neoliberal capitalist
strategies reveals not only that are there ample openings for resistance
and redirection, but that rollout and resistance may be embodied in the
same policy and in fact the same person. All of the attendees at the
WQT forums were active, and for the most part enthusiastic, partici-
pants in the creation of new neoliberal economic forms, and yet there
was a good deal of open conflict on the specifics of market design,
conflict that continues to threaten the integrity of the entire policy ini-
tiative and to which few effective responses are offered. Economists,
when asked for specific information on how best to set price or stimu-
late production, respond unhelpfully with Say’s Law, the Law of Large
Numbers, and other abstractions in the form of normative fables. Prato’s
epigram above is one such fable: WQT and wetland banking are not
new under the sun, and require no retooling of the basics of neolib-
eral economic policy. The state tells a parallel fable: the privatization
of nature is going to interpellate all of us as producers or consumers in
a marketplace of ideas, services, and other commodities. As the state
informed us at the opening session of a recent national conference on
water quality trading: “No matter where you said you’re from when
you stood up for the roll call this morning, you’re in here as business
innovators”.25
The emptiness of these fables is dangerous, because under neoliberal
capitalism we have accepted the role of price as a principal guarantor of
democracy. Liberal economics was (and is) embraced politically not only
because it advanced capitalism, but because it promised a way to replace
the visible violence of political struggle with the invisible violence of
economic struggle, to reduce differences to preferences (Harvey 1990;
Lefebvre [1974] 1991:396). If people can be rendered as different only in
our utility functions, then these differences can be reconciled in a market
rather than a battlefield. This is the political context in which, increas-
ingly, “democratic choice” has been defined as “choice in a market”, an
arrangement that makes a price mechanism working smoothly enough
to reach Pareto-optimality the guarantor of democracy. Evidence that
the price mechanism fails to operate as desired strikes at the heart of the
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political rationale for neoliberalism and points towards neoliberalism’s
failure on its own terms.
In short, price in emerging markets for poorly defined commodities
doesn’t work the way neoliberal theory needs it to in order to deliver
on its promise of market-led democracy. As we are evidently in a pe-
riod of market expansion into new kinds of property and commodities,
such situations may be assumed to be relatively common, and we should
pay particular attention to the justification of initiatives to commodify
“ecosystem services” such as clean air and biodiversity. Were economists
not impervious to a world of countervailing data, this should be disturb-
ing to them; but while doing this kind of ground-truthing on neoliberal
claims is valuable, it is not going to convince economists insulated by
Friedman’s methodology. They will never be the audience that matters;
efforts to fact-check neoliberal claims are much more potent when in-
serted directly into the political and policy realm. A little grey geography
goes a long way (Peck 1999) when economists have ceded the field of
providing specific answers and suggestions instead of laws. It can be very
effective to produce answers that recognize the actual conditions under
which entrepreneurs and consumers make decisions, using venues and
language likely to engage rather than repel their interest (Robertson 2006
is one very modest attempt). It can also be illustrative to demonstrate
the emptiness of welfare economic precepts, eg by pushing them to ad
absurdum limits in the context of stakeholder forums. Such work requires
that we understand the agents of neoliberal capitalism as complex and
conflicted identities rather than as automatons.
On the ground, price discovery and commodity identities are results
of people muddling through, and these producers, consumers and regu-
lators are seeking guidance:
Sociology enters the equation in the problem of how actors produce a
social world stable enough that they can sell those goods and services
at a price at which the organization will survive. Managing people and
uncertain environments to produce stability is a sizable task. Those
who do it every day often demonstrate great skill and creativity as they
lurch from crisis to crisis. (Fligstein 2001:18)
Neoliberal theorists are necessarily blind to many of the spaces where
such issues are hammered out; I have only gestured at the deep tripartite
disconnect between economic theorists, neoliberal policy advocates, and
actual entrepreneurs on how neoliberal capitalism should be rolled out.
Some of the people muddling through are in farm fields in Minnesota,
some work at sewage treatment plants in Durango, and some are in
think tanks in Washington DC. They are waiting for answers that critical
geographers can provide. What is the commodity? How do we set price?
The answers they get can help advance neoliberal strategy, redirect it,
or drive it toward the rocks of its own contradictions.
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Endnotes
1 Daniel Bromley, University of Wisconsin Department of Agricultural and Applied
Economics, personal communication, May 2000. See also his book Sufficient Reason
(2006).
2 Dennis King, University of Maryland Department of Economics, 7 November 2005,
speaking at the National Forum on Synergies Between Water Quality Trading and
Wetland Mitigation Banking, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington,
DC. The proceedings are detailed in ELI (2005).
3 The two theorems state, in short, that (1) markets in competitive equilibrium produce
optimal social welfare (ie Pareto-optimality), and (2) any initial distribution of resources
can lead to equilibrium.
4 When I discuss Say’s Law, it is not with the intention of erecting a straw man. A normal-
science reading of economics regards Say’s Law as irrelevant: students of demand-side
economics were taught that the Law was superseded by Keynesianism, and students
of supply-side economics were taught that it was superseded by the Arrow-Debreu
proof. These traditions aside, what concerns me here is that the Law itself is still cited
authoritatively in the actual forums in which decisions are made concerning how to
construct markets.
5 I use “mainstream economics” in a way that overlaps with “neoclassical economics” or
“classical liberal economics” to indicate the utility-based methodologically individualist
approach to economics that has become so hegemonic in the United States since World
War II that it can barely conceive of coherent opposition to its precepts.
6
“Point-source” and “non-point-source” pollution in water are legal terms of art: any
discrete conveyance that can be said to resemble a pipe, delivering concentrated effluent,
is regulated under Section 302 of the CWA. The diffuse entry of pollutants (say, from
farm-field runoff) is not (Findley and Farber 1999:375).
7 Susan Burke, Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, at the Second National
Water Quality Trading Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, 24 May 2006.
8 Tony Prato, University of Missouri Department of Economics, comment at the US EPA
Research Planning Conference on Wetlands and Water Quality Trading, 16 February
2006, Chicago, IL. The proceedings are detailed in EPA ORD (forthcoming).
9 James Shortle, Pennsylvania State University Department of Agricultural Economics,
comment at the Second National Water Quality Trading Conference, 23 May 2006,
Pittsburgh, PA.
10 The South Nation Conservancy website encourages landowners to apply for
SNC’s grants program as a source of funding for projects which will improve
water quality. However, the site does not reveal that the SNC accumulates “water
quality credits” thereby, which will be purchased by polluters: http://www.nation.
on.ca/English/CleanWater.htm.
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11 http://www.miamiconservancy.org/water/quality credit.asp
12 Dennis King, University of Maryland Department of Economics, 11 July 2005, speak-
ing at the National Forum on Synergies Between Water Quality Trading and Wetland
Mitigation Banking, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC.
The proceedings are detailed in ELI 2005. The Law of Large Numbers, in its weak
form, states that given an infinite sequence of uncorrelated random variables, where all
have the same expected value and variance, the sample average will tend to converge on
the expected value. King’s use was inappropriate because it assumes identical expected
values and variance for all BMP implementations.
13 The positions in this paragraph paraphrase a three-way discussion between Iowa State
University ecologist William Crumpton, University of Missouri economist Tony Prato,
and EPA staffer Sue Elston at the 2006 Chicago forum.
14 The Hon Bruce Knight, chief of USDA’s Natural Resource Conservation Service,
25 May 2006, speaking at the Second National Water Quality Trading Conference,
Pittsburgh, PA.
15 Interview conducted 4 December 2002.
16 Interview conducted 7 November 2002. While many Minnesota bankers are non-
entrepreneurial in their identity as wetland bankers, and the banking community
nationwide tends to dismiss Minnesota on this ground, this interviewee is thor-
oughly entrepreneurial in his approach and has participated in moderately success-
ful attempts to organize Minnesota wetland bankers into a self-identified fraction of
capital.
17 Interview conducted 19 July 2001.
18 Interview conducted 12 February 2003.
19 Interview conducted 25 July 2001.
20 Interview conducted 27 February 2002.
21 Tony Prato, University of Missouri Department of Economics, comment at the US EPA
Research Planning Conference on Wetlands and Water Quality Trading, 16 February
2006, Chicago, IL. The proceedings are detailed in EPA ORD (forthcoming).
22 The Hon George Dunlop, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works,
26 April 2006, speaking at the Ninth National Mitigation and Conservation Banking
Conference, Portland, OR. Dunlop is the political appointee in charge of the regulatory
branch of the US Army Corps of Engineers.
23 Brent Fewell, USEPA Deputy Assistant Administrator for Water, 25 May 2006, speak-
ing at the Second National Water Quality Trading Conference, Pittsburgh, PA.
24 The Hon George Dunlop, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works,
26 April 2006, speaking at the Ninth National Mitigation and Conservation Banking
Conference, Portland, OR.
25 Bryon Griffith, chief of the US EPA Gulf of Mexico Program, 23 May 2006, speaking
at the Second National Water Quality Trading Conference, Pittsburgh, PA.
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